Here is a sample of some of the new laws that went into effect July 1, 2010. For a complete listing of the Florida Statutes you can visit http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Welcome/index.cfm?CFID=117883427&CFTOKEN=46768859

Poker (SB 622):

Changes: Makes no-limit poker legal at all 23 state-sanctioned poker rooms. The previous betting limit had been $5 with a $100 maximum buy-in for cash games.

Impact: The high-stakes poker rules are expected to attract professional players and TV tournaments to Florida. The changes were included in the blackjack gambling deal with the Seminole Indian tribe.

Underage drinking (HB 33):

Changes: Stiffens criminal penalties for anyone caught two or more times giving alcohol to underage drinkers. Anyone who facilitates underage drinking would be subject to a first-degree misdemeanor on the second offense.

Impact: Aimed at cutting underage drinking. Nearly half — 48 percent — of high school seniors in Florida reported drinking alcohol within the previous month in a 2007 study.

School prayer (HB 31):

Changes: Prohibits school boards from taking any action or entering into any agreement that violates the First Amendment rights of teachers or students. The law came in reaction to a Santa Rosa County case in which the school board, in a settlement with the ACLU, agreed to ban teachers from participating in prayers at school events.

Impact: Some critics claim this law will set the legal groundwork for prayer in Florida public schools.

Bright Futures (HB 5201):

Changes: Makes it tougher to get a Bright Futures merit-based scholarship, raising ACT and SAT requirements.

Students using Bright Futures money also will have five years rather than seven to complete their undergraduate studies.

Impact: Lawmakers are trying to rein in runaway costs of Bright Futures Scholarships, funded by Lottery revenues. There are a projected 182,000 Bright Futures recipients next year, compared with 140,000 five years ago. The state budgeted $437 million for the program.

FAU medical school (HB 1581):

Changes: Authorizes a new, stand-alone medical school at Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, the sixth university in the state to have one. The others are the University of Florida, Florida State University, the University of Miami, University of Central Florida and Florida International University.

Impact: The move could boost FAU’s academic profile and allow it to strengthen its medical research partnership with Scripps Florida, based in Palm Beach County. Since 2002, FAU has had a medical program in conjunction with the University of Miami.

Short sales (HB 109):

Changes: Lowers the amount of state taxes residents pay when they sell their homes through short sales, when the sale price is less than the outstanding debt. The state will not collect taxes on the canceled debt, or the difference between the sale price and what is owed on the house.

Impact: Short sales have become common due to the sharp decline in real estate values. Nearly half, or 46 percent, of homeowners in the Fort Lauderdale- Miami market are underwater on their mortgages, meaning they owe more than their house is worth, according to Zillow.com.

The bong bill (HB 366):

Changes: Makes it a crime to sell bongs or smoking pipes unless they are sold in a shop that gets 75 percent of its revenue from tobacco, cigar and cigarette sales.

Impact: Florida tried to ban drug paraphernalia in the 1980s, but specialty stores still sell bongs, water pipes and other pipes made of wood, metal or ice. The law aims at shutting down those shops.

Horse meat (HB 765):

Changes: Creates criminal penalties for anyone who possesses, purchases, transports or distributes horse meat for human consumption.

Impact: South Florida has experienced a wave of horse killings in recent years, with at least 21 horses slaughtered in 2009. Offenders now would be subject to third-degree felony charges. Repeat offenders would face a minimum one-year prison term.

Sexual battery (HB 525):

Changes: Eliminates the statute of limitations for criminal or civil cases related to sexual abuse of children 16 or younger. Certain sex crimes against children 12 to 16 previously had a three-year statute of limitations.

Impact: Lawsuits can now be brought in cases of sexual abuse involving a child, no matter when the abuse occurred. The bill was opposed by the Catholic Church, which has been rocked by pedophilia scandals in recent years.

Condo renters (SB 1196):

Changes: Homeowners associations can evict a renter if their landlord isn’t paying the condo or association fees.

Impact: Many condo owners, particularly investment owners, are in foreclosure and not paying association fees, but still collecting rent checks from their tenants. This law could put renters on the hook to pay the fees or face eviction.

Civics education (HB 105):

Changes: Requires sixth-grade students to take a course in civics education beginning in 2012. The class must teach students about the different levels and branches of government and historic documents such as the U.S. Constitution.

Impact: Civic knowledge remains low. Polls show far more Americans can name the “American Idol” judges than the Supreme Court chief justice. (Answer: John Roberts).

Truck weights (HB 1271):

Changes: Authorizes the Florida Department of Transportation to issue permits for any truck up to 88,000 pounds, a 10 percent increase over the current size limit.

Impact: Critics of the new law say heavier trucks will clog roadways and lead to more dangerous driving conditions. In 2008, 263 Floridians died in car crashes involving large trucks.

“Curbstoning” (HB 631):

Changes: Allows local government to institute rules cracking down on “curbstoning,” the practice of putting a for-sale sign on cars parked on city streets. Local governments could issue minimum $100 citations and immediately tow curbstoned vehicles. Individuals would not be prohibited from displaying cars for sale on private property.

Impact: Meant to discourage unscrupulous car dealers from posing as individual sellers.

Tax amnesty (5801):

Changes: Businesses and individuals who owe the state back taxes can pay up without penalties and get a 50 percent discount on interest fees for a three-month amnesty period beginning July 1

Impact: The state anticipates recouping $83 million in the three months. The last tax amnesty in Florida was in 2003.

Children’s service councils (SB 2014):

Changes: Mandates referendums by 2016 in Broward and Palm Beach counties and by 2020 in Miami-Dade County on whether children’s services councils should continue to exist. After the initial referedums, the councils would need new authorization from voters every 12 years to continue to collect taxes.

Impact: Could lead to the elimination of children’s services councils. Critics of independent taxing districts complain they levy taxes even though their board members are not elected.

WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court rejected the National Football League’s request for broad antitrust law protection Monday, saying that it must be considered 32 separate teams — not one big business — when selling branded items like jerseys and caps. “Although NFL teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned,” said the retiring Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court.

The high court reversed a lower court ruling throwing out an antitrust suit brought against the league by one of its former hat makers, who was upset that it lost its contract for making official NFL hats to Reebok International Ltd.

American Needle Inc. sued, claiming the league violated antitrust law because all 32 teams worked together to freeze it out of the NFL-licensed hatmaking business and gave Reebok an exclusive 10-year license.

The company lost and appealed to the Supreme Court, but the NFL did as well, hoping to get broader protection from antitrust lawsuits.

American Needle’s antitrust lawsuit now heads back to the lower court. The NFL said in a statement released after the ruling Monday that it was confident it would ultimately be victorious.

In its statement, the NFL noted that the Supreme Court’s decision pertained only to merchandise and didn’t affect “collective bargaining, which is governed by labor law.”

“In today’s decision, the Supreme Court recognized that ’special characteristics’ of professional sports leagues, including the need for competitive balance, ‘may well justify’ business decisions that among independent competitors would otherwise be unlawful. The court noted that the NFL teams’ shared interest in making the league successful and cooperating to produce NFL football provide ‘a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of collective decisions,’” the NFL said.

Had the NFL won this case, it may have been able to — as one business entity — implement salaries for its players and its coaches instead of having the current system of individual players bargaining for deals. The biggest thing that came from this ruling on Monday is it could kick-start labor extension talks and prevent a lockout in 2011.

DeMaurice Smith, the NFLPA’s executive director, welcomed the ruling.

“Today’s Supreme Court ruling is not only a win for the players past, present and future, but a win for the fans. While the NFLPA and the players of the National Football League are pleased with the ruling, we remain focused on reaching a fair and equitable Collective Bargaining Agreement. We hope that today also marks a renewed effort by the NFL to bargain in good faith and avoid a lockout,” Smith said in a statement Monday.

Major League Baseball is the only professional sports league with broad antitrust protection. The National Basketball Association, the National Hockey League, the NCAA, NASCAR, professional tennis and Major League Soccer supported the NFL in this case, hoping the high court would expand broad antitrust exemption to other sports.

But Stevens said NFL teams directly compete on many levels. Citing the two teams in this year’s Super Bowl, the New Orleans Saints and the Indianapolis Colts, Stevens said that teams compete against each other “to attract fans, for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel.”

“Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market for intellectual property,” Stevens said. “To a firm making hats, the Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of valuable trademarks.”

American Needle was one of many companies that made NFL headgear until the league awarded an exclusive contract to Reebok. Lower courts threw out American Needle’s lawsuit, holding that nothing in antitrust law prohibits NFL teams from cooperating on apparel licensing so the league can compete against other forms of entertainment.

But the high court turned away that theory and sent American Needle’s antitrust lawsuit back to the lower court.

“Decisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned trademarks collectively and to only one vendor are decisions that ‘deprive the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking … and therefore of actual or potential competition,’” Stevens said.

Just because NFL teams have a single organization, the National Football League Properties, to jointly develop, license and market its logos, does not mean the NFL can escape antitrust scrutiny, Stevens said.

“If the fact that potential competitors shared in profits or losses from a venture meant that the venture was immune from” antitrust law, Stevens said, “then any cartel ‘could evade the antitrust law simply by creating a “joint venture” to serve as the exclusive seller of their competing products.’”

The argument that NFL teams also need each other to play an NFL season also doesn’t work, Stevens said. “A nut and a bolt can only operate together, but an agreement between nut and bolt manufacturers is still subject to” antitrust scrutiny, Stevens said.

The league argued that a court decision against it “would convert every league of separately owned clubs into a walking antitrust conspiracy” and bring legal challenges to any decisions that the teams make collectively like scheduling.

But Stevens disagreed.

“The fact that NFL teams share an interest in making the entire league successful and profitable, and that they must cooperate in the production and scheduling of games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of collective decisions,” he said.

The case is American Needle v. NFL, 08-661.

Courtesy of espn.com

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FLORIDA v . POWELL

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida

——————————————————————————–

No. 08–1175. Argued December 7, 2009—Decided February 23, 2010

——————————————————————————–

In a pathmarking decision, Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 , this Court held that an individual must be “clearly informed,” prior to custodial questioning, that he has, among other rights, “the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.”

After arresting respondent Powell, but before questioning him, Tampa Police read him their standard Miranda form, stating, inter alia : “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” and “[y]ou have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.” Powell then admitted he owned a handgun found in a police search. He was charged with possession of a weapon by a convicted felon in violation of Florida law. The trial court denied Powell’s motion to suppress his inculpatory statements, which was based on the contention that the Miranda warnings he received did not adequately convey his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning. Powell was convicted of the gun-possession charge, but the intermediate appellate court held that the trial court should have suppressed the statements. The Florida Supreme Court agreed. It noted that both Miranda and the State Constitution require that a suspect be clearly informed of the right to have a lawyer present during questioning. The advice Powell received was misleading, the court believed, because it suggested that he could consult with an attorney only before the police started to question him and did not convey his entitlement to counsel’s presence throughout the interrogation.

Held:

1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case. Powell contends that jurisdiction is lacking because the Florida Supreme Court relied on the State’s Constitution as well as Miranda, hence the decision rested on an adequate and independent state ground. See Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U. S. 722 . Under Michigan v. Long , 463 U. S. 1032 , however, when a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and the adequacy and independence of any possible state-law ground is not clear from the face of its opinion, this Court presumes that federal law controlled the state court’s decision. Although invoking Florida’s Constitution and precedent in addition to this Court’s decisions, the Florida court did not expressly assert that state-law sources gave Powell rights distinct from, or broader than, those delineated in Miranda . See Long , 463 U. S., at 1044. The state-court opinion consistently trained on what Miranda demands, rather than on what Florida law independently requires. This Court therefore cannot identify, “from the face of the opinion,” a clear statement that the decision rested on a state ground separate from Miranda . See Long , 463 U. S., at 1041. Because the opinion does not “indicat[e] clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds,” Long, 463 U. S., at 1041, this Court has jurisdiction. Pp. 4–7.

2. Advice that a suspect has “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the law enforcement officers’] questions,” and that he can invoke this right “at any time … during th[e] interview,” satisfies Miranda . Pp. 7–13.

(a) Miranda requires that a suspect “be warned prior to any questioning … that he has the right to the presence of an attorney.” 384 U. S., at 479. This Miranda warning addresses the Court’s particular concern that “[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege [to remain silent] by his interrogators.” Id. , at 469. Responsive to that concern, the Court stated, as “an absolute prerequisite to interrogation,” that an individual held for questioning “must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” Id. , at 471. While the warnings prescribed by Miranda are invariable, this Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. See, e.g., California v. Prysock , 453 U. S. 355 . In determining whether police warnings were satisfactory, reviewing courts are not required to “examine [them] as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda .’ ” Duckworth v. Eagan , 492 U. S. 195 . Pp. 7–9.

(b) The warnings Powell received satisfy this standard. By informing Powell that he had “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [their] questions,” the Tampa officers communicated that he could consult with a lawyer before answering any particular question. And the statement that Powell had “the right to use any of [his] rights at any time [he] want[ed] during th[e] interview” confirmed that he could exercise his right to an attorney while the interrogation was underway. In combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed the right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times. To reach the opposite conclusion, i.e., that the attorney would not be present throughout the interrogation, the suspect would have to imagine the counterintuitive and unlikely scenario that, in order to consult counsel, he would be obliged to exit and reenter the interrogation room between each query. Likewise unavailing is the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that the warning was misleading because the temporal language that Powell could “talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the officers’] questions” suggested he could consult with an attorney only before the interrogation started. In context, the term “before” merely conveyed that Powell’s right to an attorney became effective before he answered any questions at all. Nothing in the words used indicated that counsel’s presence would be restricted after the questioning commenced. Powell suggests that today’s holding will tempt law enforcement agencies to end-run Miranda by amending their warnings to introduce ambiguity. But, as the Federal Government explains, it is in law enforcement’s own interest to state warnings with maximum clarity in order to reduce the risk that a court will later find the advice inadequate and therefore suppress a suspect’s statement. The standard warnings used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation are admirably informative, but the Court declines to declare their precise formulation necessary to meet Miranda ’s requirements. Different words were used in the advice Powell received, but they communicated the same message. Pp. 9–13.

998 So. 2d 531, reversed and remanded.

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined as to Part II. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined as to Part II.

PHILADELPHIA (AP) — A police officer used a Taser gun to apprehend a fan who ran onto the field during a Phillies game Monday night, and the team and the police are investigating whether it was an appropriate use of force.

The fan, wearing a baseball cap, red T-shirt and khaki shorts, hopped a fence and scurried around the outfield, eluding two security officers in the bottom of the eighth inning against the St. Louis Cardinals. One officer used a Taser and the fan went down in a heap. Several Phillies placed gloves over their faces and appeared to be stifling laughter at the wild scene.

Phillies spokeswomen Bonnie Clark said the police department is investigating the matter and discussing with the team whether using the stun gun was appropriate.

Police spokesman Lt. Frank Vanore told The Philadelphia Inquirer police internal affairs will open an investigation to determine if the firing “was proper use of the equipment.”

Vanore was not made available to The Associated Press when a call was placed to the police department’s public affairs office late Monday night.

The teams said it’s the first time a Taser has been used by police to apprehend a spectator who ran onto the field.

The fan was 17-year-old male and he will be charged with criminal trespass and related offenses, the team said. The Phillies did not release his name because he is a juvenile.

-Courtesy of the Associated Press

Have you been arrested for Petit Theft in Central Florida?? If so, the attorneys in our office have handled thousands of these types of cases. Below you will find an overview of the Petit Theft statute 812.014.
3)(a) Theft of any property not specified in subsection (2) is petit theft of the second degree and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, and as provided in subsection (5), as applicable.

(b) A person who commits petit theft and who has previously been convicted of any theft commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(c) A person who commits petit theft and who has previously been convicted two or more times of any theft commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

As you can tell by the aforementioned statute, Petit Theft is a crime that can be enhanced. The maximum punishment for a first time Petit Theft (under $300.00) is 60 days in jail. It can also be punishable by up to 6 months probation and or a $500.00 fine. If you find yourself facing a second Petit Theft charge, the maximum is 364 days in jail or 12 months probation and or a $1,000.00. If it’s your third Petit Theft charge, it can be upgraded to a third degree felony which carries a maximum of 5 years in prison or 5 years probation and or a $5,000.00 fine.

In addition to the potential criminal sanctions, your driving privilege can be in jeopardy as well.

(5)(b) In addition to the penalties prescribed in paragraph (3)(a), every judgment of guilty of a petit theft for property described in this subsection shall provide for the suspension of the convicted person’s driver’s license. The court shall forward the driver’s license to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles in accordance with s. 322.25.

1. The first suspension of a driver’s license under this subsection shall be for a period of up to 6 months.

2. The second or subsequent suspension of a driver’s license under this subsection shall be for a period of 1 year.

All of the aforementioned could be avoided or seriously reduced if you hire an attorney. There are many resolutions that could be attained ranging from dismissal and or non-conviction through an acquittal at trial.

If you find yourself facing a Petit Theft charge, take it seriously. Help is just a phone call away.

-Chris Atcachunas, Esquire

You’ve been arrested….now what?? Well, the first thing you must do is bond out of jail (if eligible for a bond) by posting a cash bond or via surety bond through a bonding agency. However, depending on your case, you may have other stipulations and conditions upon your release.

One of the many avenues of release is through a Pre-Trial Release program (PTR). This may be granted at your initial appearance (IA) along with a bond amount, or on its own without a bond amount. The PTR program provides supervision for those offenders who have been charged with an offense and are awaiting trial or other disposition of their case. It is utilized by the Courts to improve the percentage of offenders that appear for their case disposition. Defendants report weekly either in person or by phone and court date appearance is stressed.

Another potential condition of release may be Home Confinement or House Arrrest. Electronic monitoring is offered by Court Programs, Inc. They provide an alternative option to incarceration. House arrest has three options available as to its use: First, traditional house arrest provides the defendant with a transmitter and a monitor that is attached to an active telephone line inside their residence. Second, there is the ability to monitor defendants that do not have a telephone or who can’t afford one. This is through cellular phone technology within the house arrest unit. The third option is Global Positioning Systems, (G.P.S.). Active G.P.S. is an intensive supervision with the defendant being monitored constantly via satellite technology. It enables us to track the exact location of the defendant and his movements anywhere in the world. We utilize a one piece unit which is active and operates on cellular technology. Provides electronic monitoring of certain offenders or accused offenders in the community. Officers supervise these individuals through field visits, phone contacts, and electronic monitoring. Community Surveillance reduces jail overcrowding and provides an extra level of supervision for certain inmates who are released from jail to await trial after posting bail or are sentenced to house arrest. You can visit the Court Programs, Inc. website at www.courtprograms.com or contact them at 407.426.8199.

In some instances, mostly alcohol related, the IA judge may order you to be placed on a SCRAM device. The SCRAM device monitors the consumption of alcohol by pre-trial or convicted offenders. This is done through a ankle monitor and is utilized by various Courts throughout the United States. This system enables the Court to enforce the condition of no consumption of alcohol on related cases.

The above mentioned are the most popular forms of Pre-Trial Release. If you find yourself in any of said situations, we are here to help. Our office has successfully petitioned the Court to modify these terms and conditions of PTR. If you have any questions regarding your case, please contact our office.

-Christopher Atcachunas

Florida Statutes Section 322.0261(4) went into effect October 1, 2009. This new law makes it mandatory for any driver accused of violating a red light, stop sign, or other traffic sign to attend a traffic school course. Several other violations carry this consequence as well, and it applies even if the driver fights the citation in court, and is not convicted.

Florida Statutes Section 322.0261(4) reads: The department shall identify any operator convicted of, or who pleaded nolo contendere to, a violation of s. 316.074(1), s. 316.075(1)(c)1., s. 316.172, s. 316.191, or s. 316.192 and shall require that operator, in addition to other applicable penalties, to attend a department-approved driver improvement course in order to maintain driving privileges. If the operator fails to complete the course within 90 days after receiving notice from the department, the operator’s driver license shall be canceled by the department until the course is successfully completed.

On August 18, 2009, Defense aruged a Motion in Limine in regards to the 911 call. The opinion was reported in the Florida Law Weekly Supplement. State v. Payton, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 957, 958. Volume 16, Number 10, September 30, 2009.

16-flalweekly-supp-957

Orange County, County Court, November 13, 2008, Orlando, Florida

Represented the Defendant on the charges of Battery (Domestic Violence). The trial lasted one day in which the State of Florida called two witnesses and the Defense called one. After a one hour jury deliberation, the jury came back NOT GUILTY. The Defendant was facing a maximum of 1 year in the County Jail.

Orange County, Circuit Court, September 23-24, 2009, Orlando, Florida

Represented the Defendant on the charges of Sexual Activity with a Child and Lewd and Lascivious Battery. The trial lasted two days in which the State of Florida called 5 witnesses and the Defense called one. The Defense was successful keeping out Williams Rule evidence that the State of Florida wanted to introduce. After a mere 45 minute jury deliberation, the jury came back NOT GUILTY on all counts. The Defendant was facing a maximum of 45 years in the Department of Corrections.

Osceola County, County Court, September 23, 2009, Kissimmee, Florida

Represented the Defendant on the charge of Prostitution. The trial lasted one day, where the State of Florida called one witness and the Defense called one as well. The Defense successfully argued for the preferred jury instruction. After an hour and a half jury deliberation, the jury came back NOT GUILTY. The Defendant was facing a maximum of 60 days in the County Jail.

PTD UPDATE